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Clinical pragmatics has been a major growth area in clinical linguistics and speech 
and language pathology over the past two decades. Its scope is vast: if we define 
pragmatics in broad terms, there are no communicative disorders which do not 
involve pragmatic impairment at least to some degree (Perkins, 2003). Early work in 
the area tended to focus on the application of pragmatic theory in the analysis of 
pragmatic impairment (e.g. speech act theory (Hirst, LeDoux, & Stein, 1984), 
conversational implicature (Damico, 1985) and, more recently, relevance theory 
(Leinonen & Kerbel, 1999)) and on the development of pragmatic assessments, tests 
and profiles which included a theoretically eclectic range of items drawn from both 
pragmatic theory and elsewhere (e.g. Bishop, 1998; Penn, 1985; Prutting & Kirchner, 
1983). In more recent years there has been an increasing interest in the neurological 
and cognitive bases of pragmatic impairment (e.g. Paradis, 1998; Perkins, 2000; 
Stemmer, 1999) and in the use of interactional approaches such as conversation 
analysis (e.g. Goodwin, 2003). This special issue of Clinical Linguistics and 
Phonetics draws on all of these areas but focuses on a particular aspect of pragmatic 
impairment which has often been overlooked – namely, that the behaviours we 
describe as pragmatic impairments are in fact the outcome of very varied and highly 
complex processes. This neglect is partly due to a common tendency to see pragmatics 
as a separate ‘level’ or even ‘module’ of language, on a par with syntax and semantics. 
Influenced on the one hand by speech act theory, with its distinction between language 
structure and communicative acts, and on the other hand by clinical populations who 
were either able to communicate well despite being linguistically impaired or else were 
poor communicators despite having good linguistic ability, clinicians assumed there to 
be a clear dissociation between linguistic and pragmatic competence. Although there is 
still considerable neurological evidence for a broadly modular view in terms of the 
lateralisation of linguistic and pragmatic functions, there is also compelling evidence for 
seeing pragmatic impairment as a more complex, non-unitary phenomenon. Non-
modular, or ‘interactional’, views of pragmatic impairment have been influenced by 
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connectionist and functional models of linguistic and cognitive processing (e.g. Bates, 
Thal, & MacWhinney, 1991), by a growing awareness of the role played in pragmatics 
by cognitive capacities such as inference, theory of mind and executive function (Martin 
& McDonald, 2003), and by approaches such as Conversation Analysis (e.g. Damico, 
Oelschlaeger, & Simmons-Mackie, 1999) which focus on those features of pragmatics 
which can only be accounted for in terms of interpersonal, collaborative activity. All of 
these interactional approaches share a view of pragmatic impairment as ‘emergent’, or 
‘epiphenomenal’ (Perkins, 1998), rather than as a stand-alone, monadic entity. 
 
The general notion of emergence is discussed in the first paper in this issue, though a 
brief preliminary introduction may be helpful. ‘Emergentism’ – i.e. the 
conceptualisation of phenomena as emergent rather than inherently unitary – derives 
from a view of the world which pays specific attention to association and interaction, 
as opposed to dissociation and discreteness. This does not mean that it is necessarily 
anti-modular, but that rather than focus on entities and categories which simply 
appear distinct or are deemed so a priori, it looks instead at the possible influence of 
underlying factors which may have determined their make-up. Emergentism is thus 
inherently reductionist and ‘bottom-up’ in the sense that it sees apparently unitary 
phenomena as the complex outcome of interactions between subordinate elements. 
The primary focus, though, is on the interactions rather than the sub-elements. 
Emergent phenomena are not merely the sum of a set of parts, but the result of the 
complex relationships in play among the parts. Indeed, the parts may themselves be 
seen as emergent in their own right, the result of an iterative set of  “interactions all 
the way down” (Elman et al., 1996: 319). The natural tendency in scientific enquiry to 
apply categorial labels to phenomena, and thereby implicitly to reify them as distinct 
entities, derives from our need to understand and represent things in such a way as to 
enable rational explanation. Such a process is inherent in modelling, analogy and 
metaphor. This is perfectly acceptable, as long as we do not lose sight of the fact that 
these constructs are our own creations which exist solely in the metaworlds of 
scientific theory, heuristic enquiry and folk explanation. They are unlikely to mirror 
the phenomena they seek to explain except indirectly.  
 
The papers in this special issue all regard emergence as a key feature of pragmatic 
impairment. In particular, their authors agree that a) pragmatics is an emergent 
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consequence of interactions which take place both within and between individuals; b) 
the behaviours that we identify as pragmatic impairments represent an interactional 
solution to competing demands made on a limited or reduced set of linguistic/ 
cognitive/ neurological/ anatomical/ sensorimotor/ interpersonal resources; c) 
compensatory adaptive processes typically play an integral role in such behaviours. 
The last point is particularly important. Compensatory adaptation has been a common 
topic in research on communication disorders for a considerable time, but within an 
emergentist framework it becomes an integral feature, rather than an exceptional or 
incidental process. The common perspective of the papers does not mean that the 
articles are all cut from the same cloth in every respect. The authors include both 
linguists and clinicians, use a range of theoretical approaches and analytical methods 
and present data from a diverse set of communication disorders including aphasia 
(Ahlsén, Rhys), traumatic brain injury (Body and Parker), autism (Damico and 
Nelson), Alzheimer’s disease (Müller and Guendouzi) and specific language 
impairment (Perkins).  
 
The first paper (Perkins) introduces the notion of emergence and argues that 
emergentist accounts of pragmatics afford more thorough explanations of pragmatic 
impairment than approaches derived directly from pragmatic theory, and are therefore 
of more immediate use to clinicians. An emergentist model which encompasses both 
pragmatic ability and disability is outlined, and is illustrated using data from a child 
with specific language impairment. Jack Damico and Ryan Nelson examine two 
distinct types of atypical systematic behaviour in a 13 year old boy with autism using 
the analytical method of conversation analysis (CA). They show that these behaviours 
are in fact compensatory adaptations to underlying deficits in symbolic meaning-
making capacity, and that their very atypicality may lead them to be perceived as 
communicative deficits in their own right. In their discussion they trace the notion of 
emergence in pragmatics back to earlier theoretical work by Vygotsky and Piaget. 
Catrin Rhys also makes use of CA to explain instances of compensatory adaptation, 
but in her case in the communication of an adult with Broca’s aphasia. Focusing in 
particular on the use of gaze, she is able to show the complex way in which meaning 
may be distributed across different modalities – namely, how linguistic impairment 
triggers a redeployment of gaze which in turn results in a redeployment of gesture. A 
key feature is the way in which both participants collaborate in this reallocation of 
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semiotic resources. Richard Body and Mark Parker provide an analysis of topic 
repetitiveness in interactions with a man with traumatic brain injury. They show that 
what may superficially be labelled as pragmatically anomalous behaviour is actually 
the emergent consequence of underlying problems with executive function and 
memory in conjunction with the conversational strategies used by his interlocutors. 
They argue that repetitiveness can only be properly understood as a product of joint 
interpersonal activity. Elisabeth Ahlsén’s paper compares the way in which two 
separate individuals with limited linguistic ability compensate for this in a role play. 
One has aphasia, and the other is a second-language learner. Each deploys a range of 
strategies with some success, and the re-division of labour between linguistic 
expression and gesture is evident in both. Although some of the strategies are 
attributable to the specific type of deficit, others appear to be result of unrelated 
individual differences. Nicole Müller and Jacki Guendouzi present conversational 
data from two individuals with dementia of the Alzheimer’s type (DAT) and discuss 
ways in which systematic patterns in the data may be attributable to a combination of 
underlying factors including memory, linguistic, affective and sensorimotor problems, 
within a conversational setting. Once again, the joint contribution of both 
conversational participants is integral. The central theme in all the papers is the 
emergence of pragmatic impairments via a process of compensatory adaptation from 
the impact of linguistic, cognitive or sensorimotor deficits on interpersonal 
communication. 
 
The articles published in this special issue are not unique. They are representative of 
research currently being carried out in several areas of clinical pragmatics, and it is 
not hard to think of other recently published work that could sit comfortably in a 
collection such as this – particularly that which takes the perspective of CA. However, 
by focusing explicitly on the emergent nature of pragmatic impairment, it is hoped 
that its centrality and significance may be better appreciated by researchers and 
clinicians working in all areas of clinical pragmatics and also beyond. Emergence is 
by no means unique to pragmatic impairment but is integral to all communication 
disorders. 
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